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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Almon Manes passed away on February 10, 2009. R 6. During his last days he relied
upon Samson to help him with his estate. TR 165 II 23 through 166 II 5. Upon his passing,
Miller, the personal representative, engaged Samson to supervise the estate. Petitioner's

Exhibit 1. Shortly after Manes' death or while upon his deathbed, in February of 2009,
Miller proposed compensating Samson with personalty from the estate. TR 183 11 4-9.
Samson rejected the February of 2009 offer stating that he would need money. Id. Miller
responded by saying he would be "well-compensated." TR 1281114-22, & 182 II 17-20.
Samson did not recollect an hourly rate of pay. TR 182 II 22-25.
Samson began working for the estate in February of 2009 under an implied contract.
TR 128 ll 12-22 & 183 ll 4-9. Samson had been working on the Estate for several months,
when in May of 2009, Miller sent Samson a written proposal for his consideration. See

Petitioner's Exhibit 7. Samson expressly rejected Miller's May of 2009 proposal, bur
continued to work for the estate under the terms of the February 2009 implied contract
TR 1341120 through 135 111-3 & 151114-11.
Further, Miller wrote to Samson often and on at least two occasions asked him to
accept cash money in partial payment for his labor. Petitioner's Exhibic 6 & 12. Samson \vas
terminated in September and in October he sent a written bill to Miller. Petitioner's Exhibit
8 & 9A. The bill was not paid, his claim thereon disallowed, and the matter was heard by

~/Iagistrate Jeff Payne who allowed the bulk of the claim. Miller filed a motion to reconsider,
the motion was heard and denied by Judge Payne. Miller appealed to the District Court and
the District Court affirmed the Magistrate's decision.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the Magistrate court err when it determined that the parties did not have a May

2009 express contract based upon performance -- or rather -- did the Nagistrate err
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in determining that negotiations in May of 2009 did not result in a modification of
the February of 2009 implied-in-fact contract?
2. Did the Magistrate Court err by finding a February 2009 implied-in-fact contract
existed between the parties?
3. Did the Magistrate Court err in granting quantum meruit relief when said theory
was not argued by Samson?
4. Did the Magistrate Court err in awarding reasonable value of services damages and
reasonable expenses damages?
5. Is Samson entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal?

SUPREME COURT STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Supreme Court reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to
determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to
support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If those
findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom
and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.

Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670 (2008).

DISTRICT COURT'S STANDARD OF REVIEW
Imposition of an equitable remedy requires a balancing of the
equities, which is inherently a factual determination; therefore, the
district court's imposition of such a remedy should be reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. A trial court does not abuse its discretion if
it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within
the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards,
and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason. Review
of a trial court's conclusions from a bench trial is limited to
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ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact,
and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.
Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting
evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the
witnesses, this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings
of fact in favor of the judgment entered. This Court will not set
aside a trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly
erroneous. If the trial court based its findings on substantial
evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not
overturn those findings on appeal. This Court will not substitute its
view of the facts for that of the trial court. However, this Court
exercises free review over matters of law.

justad v. Ward, 14 7 Idaho 509 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

I. DID THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERR WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT THE PARTIES DID
NOT HAVE A MAY 2009 EXPRESS CONTRACT BASED UPON PERFORMANCE -- OR RATHER
-- DID THE MAGISTRATE ERR IN DETERMINING THAT NEGOTIATIONS IN MAY OF 2009
DID NOT RESULT IN A MODIFICATION OF THE FEBRUARY OF 2009 IMPLIED-IN-FACT
CONTRACT?
Neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals considers assignments of
error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. See Ho99 v. Wolske,
142 Idaho 549, 559 (2006) ( emphasis added). Here, Miller does not cite a single authority
in support of her argument that an express contract is formed by performance -- or even
part performance as the facts of this case might lend itself to. See Appellant's Brief at 3-5.
The only authority that Miller cites in support of her issue is the rule that equity does not
intervene when an express contract prescribes the right to compensation. See Appellant's

Brief at 5. Said authority has absolutely nothing to do with the issue of whether or not
performance forms a contract. Therefore, the issue should be dismissed.
SHOULD THE FOREGOING ARGUMENT FAIL, THEN IN THE ALTERNATIVE
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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Miller appears to argue that Samson's performance of some of the provisions of
Miller's May of 2009 written proposal; and-or that statements made by Samson's attorney
regarding the use of said proposal to examine Samson at trial; operate together to form an
express contract. However, as stated above, Miller provides no authority on which to
analyze her contention.
The Idaho Supreme Court recognizes three types of contractual relationships: (1) an
express contract wherein the parries exprcss1y agree regarding a transaction: (2) an
implied-in-fact contract wherein there is no express agreement, but the conduct of the
parties implies an agreement from ,Nhich an obiigation in contract exists; and (3) an
irnplied-·in-law contract, or quasi contract. Fox ;1. Mountain West Electric. lnc., 137 Idaho
703, 707-708 (2002).
Here, the parties never agreed to Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. TR 134 ll
20 through 135 ll 1-3, & 151 114-11. Miller's May of 2009 vvritten proposal v,as nev2r
signed by Samson. Id. & see page 8 of Petitioner's Exhibir: ?, Th<'.~re vvas no testimeny or
evidence that disputes Samson's testimony or the fact that Samson's signature does not
appear on Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Samson expressly rejected the written
proposal. TR 151 II 4·· 11. Thus, it is indisputable that there was no express contract.
Formation of an express contract: based upot1 part performance is only applicable as
an exception to the statut2 of frauds. See Ogden v. Griffith, 149 Idaho 489, 493 (2010). Part
performance does not substitute for an incomplete agreement, but instead operates to
allow an agreement to be enforced when it does not comply with the statute of frauds.

Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 Idaho 87, 93 (2008). Equitable
estoppel generally, and the doctrine of part performance specifically, assume the existence
of a complete agreement. Chapin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396 (2007).
Here, Miller contends that Millers' May of 2009 written proposal, which Samson
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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rejected, should be enforced against Samson because he had performed some of the work
outlined in said proposal. (See the transcript excerpts immediately following this
paragraph for Samson's verbal rejection.) However, there was no testimony or evidence
offered that Samson accepted the proposal, Miller simply argues the point without any
evidence beyond Samson testifying that he did some of the work that was listed in the
proposed agreement. Moreover, the evidence adduced at trial was that Samson rejected
Miller's May of 2009 written proposal by refusing to sign it and by telling Miller that he did
not like the proposal:
Clark: Okay. Did you sign this agreement? [referring to Miller's
May of 2009 written proposa I]
Samson: No, I did not.
Clark: Why didn't you sign this agreement?
Samson: For one thing it was like a dictator telling me how much I
had to get done, when I can't do it that fast. When you're going
through trying to save stuff that belongs to Virginia, and I just
couldn't do it. And she wanted me to throw a lot of it away and
save all the antiques for her, and I just couldn't do it.

TR 134 11 20 through 135 11 1-3.
Clark: Did you ever receive monetary reimbursement for your
services?
Samson: Nope.
Clark: Is that one of the reasons that you didn't agree to this?
[again referring to Miller's May of 2009 written proposal]
Samson: Yes. And I disagreed to it, and I told her I did not like the
way she wrote it up. She said she was going to write another one.

TR 151114-11.
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A rejection of an offer to contract cannot be construed in any way, shape, or form as
a "complete agreement" as the part performance exception rule requires. Furthermore,
here, there was no statute of frauds defense presented by either party or the Magistrate.
Nor was there any agreement that would have been an enforceable contract, but for the
operation of the statute of frauds. Therefore, partial performance doctrine does not apply
to the present case whatsoever.
Miller argues a contract was formed in May of 2009 -- an argument that the
Magistrate considered then specifically and soundly rejected. R 72. There was no need for
the Magistrate to specifically address "part performance" exception rule to the statute of
frauds because the statute of frauds was never in play and Miller's May of 2009 written
proposal was rejected by Samson and so incurable by the part performance exception as a
matter of law.
It is true that during the trial, Samson's attorney examined Samson as to the terms of
Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Specifically Samson's attorney's inquiries were
more or less focused on the work Samson had been performing for the estate prior to
receiving Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. See TR 149 1119 through 150 111-20.
Miller's attorney objected since Samson was arguing that the contract was not enforceable.

Id. Samson's attorney simply noted that using Miller's May of 2009 written proposal to
elicit Samson's testimony was relevant because there may be a question of partial
performance. Id. Miller's attorney now appears to argue that Samson's attorney's
comment regarding relevancy somehow estopped the Magistrate from making his finding
that there was no new implied contract formed in May of 2009.
The facts of this case are remarkably similar to Treasure Valley. In Treasure Valley, a
healthcare facility attempted to circumvent the statute of frauds on an employment
contract that could not be completed in one year. ld. at 487-488. The healthcare facility
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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wanted to enforce a non-compete clause. Id. The healthcare facility presented at least two
different agreements and the doctor did not sign either one because she wanted some
revisions. Id. Nevertheless, the doctor began working for the healthcare facility and then
later, it seems, engaged in activity in contradiction to the proposed non-compete clause. Id.
The Court of Appeals ultimately held:
It was within Treasure Valley's power to insist
upon execution of the contract before Dr. Woods
began work or thereafter. Having failed to do so,
Treasure Valley is now prevented by the statute of
frauds from gaining judicial enforcement of the
contractual terms that it requesced but did not
secure.

Treasure Valley at 492. At all stages of that case, the doctor consistently denied agreeing to
all of the provisions in the draft contracts presented by the healthcare facility. Treasure

Valley at 491. Also, she specifically denied agreeing to the covenant not to compete. Id.
Treasure Valley stands for the proposition that an enforceable contract is not formed by the
acknowledgment and-or performance of one party to some terms in a proposed contract_
where the proposal was rejected and-or. specific provisions of the proposal were rejected.
In this case, Samson has consistently denied agreeing to Miller's May of 2009
written proposal in whole, and specifically denied agreeing to work for personalty only. TR
TR 1341120 through 135111-3 & TR 151114-11. Like Treasure Valley, Samson did not sign
Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Id. & Petitioner's Exhibit 7. He did not agree to the
term of no monetary compensation that Miller now seeks to have the Court impose upon
him -- in fact -- he insisted on money. TR 183 ll 4-9. In reviewing the breadth of his
testimony, it seems fair to say that this was one of the terms that Samson most objected to,
and yet Miller now asserts that the very term rejected should be the imposed term.
Samson did a lot of the work listed in Miller's May of 2009 written proposal, but he
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had already begun the work beginning in February of 2009. 1 Petitoner's Exhibit 1 & 2, & TR
157 ll 5 through 168 ll 9. His performance was coupled with the parties February of 2009
agreement that resulted in an implied contract. Id. Samson did not perform based upon
the proposed and rejected writing of May of 2009 -- no fair analysis of the evidence and the
Magistrate's findings could support such an outlandish and meritless claim. Like Treasure
Valley, Samson worked without a signed written agreement but performed many of the

duties recited in Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Like Treasure Valley, Samson
disputes agreeing to a writing he did not sign. Like Treasure Valley, Samson objected at all
relevant times to a provision that Miller is now trying to have the Court impose upon him.
Like Treasure Valley, it was within Miller's power to insist upon execution of the contract
before Samson began work or at any time thereafter. Having failed to do so, Miller is now
prevented from gaining judicial enforcement of the contractual terms that she requested
but did not secure.
Additionally, equitable estoppel cannot help Miller in her attempt to take undue
advantage of Samson, because she has neither appealed for, nor has the first element of
equitable estoppel been shown, to wit: Conduct on the part of Samson which amounts to a
false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which was calculated to
convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which
the party subsequently attempts to assert. See Treasure Valley at 490. Samson testified
that he told Miller that he "had to have money" not personalty. TR 183 II 4-9. There has
been no evidence, clear and convincing, or otherwise presented that showed Samson to
have made either: (1) a false representation that he did not want to have money; (2)
concealment that he did not want to have money; or (3) conduct which is calculated to
Similarly in Treasure Valley, although written contracts were presented to the doctor after she began working for
the healthcare facility, her performance did not invoke the partial performance doctrine. The doctor worked from
May of 1995 through February of 1997 without a written contract. Id. at 488.
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convey the impression he did not want to have money.
The Magistrate did not abuse his discretion because he correctly perceived the issue
as discretionary, he acted within the bounds of discretion and applied the correct legal
standards, he reached the decision through an exercise of reason, and based his findings on
substantial evidence. Specifically, the Magistrate's finding that there was no express or
implied contract formed as a result of Miller's May of 2009 written proposal because
Samson rejected it; therefore, the Magistrate's findings are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. See R 71 & TR 134 ll 20-25 & 135 ll 1-3. Namely, that the contract
was never signed. Id. & see page 8 of Petitioner's Exhibir 7. Also, that Samson flatly rejected
the contract directly by telling Ms. Miller that he did not like the way she wrote it up and
she responded by offering to draft another contract that might be acceptable. See TR 151 ll
4-11.

II. DID THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERR BY FINDING A FEBRUARY OF 2009 IMPLIED-INFACT CONTRACT EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES?
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized three types of contractual relationships:
First is the express contract wherein the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction.
Fox v. Mountain West Electric, 137 Idaho 703, 707-708 (2002) (internal citations omitted).

Secondly, there is the implied-in-fact contract wherein there is no express agreement but
the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract exists.
Id. The third category is called an implied- in-law contract, or quasi contract. Id. However,

a contract implied in law is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law for the
purpose of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent or the
agreement of the parties and, in some cases, in spite of an agreement between the parties.
Id. It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a
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contract, and is often referred to as quasi contract, unjust enrichment, implied in law
contract or restitution. Id.
An implied-in-fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the
contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the
performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the
performance. Id. The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and
tacit understanding. Id. The general rule is that where the conduct of the parties allows the
dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the requesting party
promised payment, then the court may find a contract implied-in -fact. Id.
Fox cites Clements. The Clements case involved an attorney (Clements) against his
former client (Jungert) for the reasonable value of attorney fees and expenses. Id. at 147.
Clements represented Jungert in a case where Jungert was judged to have committed the
tortious act of firing a rifle into the tires of a truck belonging to the Mendenhalls. Id. at 14 7
and 149. The Jungerrs were dissatisfied with the outcorne of the case and opted to not pay
Clement's his attorney fees, stating that "as far as I am concerned, you handled this matter
as the attorney for the insurance company." Clements at 149. Essentially, the trial court
found that even though no express contract was made between Clements and Jungert, that
Jungert was sufficiently put on notice that the insurance company was not going to pay for
Jungert's defense. Thus, Clements was awarded his fees. Clements at 150. The trial court's
judgment was affirmed. There was no discussion on whether or not Clements attorney
rates had been disclosed prior to Clements services being terminated. See Clements at 149.
Jungert appealed and relied upon Felton. The Supreme Court distinguished
Clements from Felton, in that in Felton, the client did not request the services, but rather had
refused the attorney's services whereas in Clements, the services had been requested.
Clements at 153.
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Here, in comparison to Clements, and Felton, and with respect to the February of
2009 implied contract, Miller requested Samson's services, and she promised to pay him,
and Samson performed said services. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1 showing that Miller had
requested and obtained Samson's services as of 2/13/2009. See Petitioner's Exhibit 6
showing Miller on 3/7/2009 thanking Samson for helping the estate and taking care of the
animals; acknowledging the inventory was a huge task; and indicating that Miller had
enclosed a check to Samson for his "labor." All of these documents were admitted as having
been written by Miller to Samson. See TR 170 II 20 through 172 II 4.
Also Samson testified that Miller approached him at the hospital when Mr. Manes
was on his deathbed.
Clark: How do you know Jessie Miller?
Samson: I've met her a few times when she's come up. Over a
period of all these years I've met her maybe twice at Almon's
house and maybe once in the Clearwater Baptist Church. And I
never met her again or seen her again until in the hospital when
Almon was in the hospital.
Clark: Okay. Can you tell me about the conversations you had with
Ms. Miller at the hospital.
Samson: Well, before Almon passed away she was trying to get
me to help her, and I didn't want no part of it. And I told her I
didn't want no part of it. And she kept hounding me and hounding
me, and on the third or fourth day she said I really need your help
because I can't trust anybody. And I said, okay. She said, I will be
well compensated. She kept telling me I would be well
compensated over this period of four days in the hospital.

TR 128 ll 5-22.
Clark: Did she ever tell you how much how she was going to
compensate you?
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Samson: Well, they -- after he passed away, it must have been
about a month, her and Randy came out. They came out I don't
know how many times. But they said they wanted to get me a cell
phone, and they were going to put me on the payroll. They
wanted to get me some health insurance because they got to
insure the property. And I'm just -- it was just amazing what I was
hearing.
Clark: Did you get any of those?
Samson: Nope.
TR 176 ll 15 through 177 ll 1 (emphasis added).
Clark: Mr. Mitchell spent some time trying to get or trying to get
at whether you were forced or you volunteered or voluntarily went
out to the Almon Manes' Estate. So my question is: Did you ever
come to the decision that you were going to work on the Almon
Manes' Estate without compensation? Was it your intent that you
would go out there and not get compensated?
Samson: No. My intent was to be well compensated.
TR 189 II 6-13.
The Magistrate did not abuse his discretion because he correctly perceived the issue
as discretionary, he acted within the bounds of discretion and applied the correct legal
standards, and reached the decision through an exercise of reason, and based his findings
on substantial evidence. Specifically, here there is substantial and competent evidence, by
Miller's own hand and words, that Mr. Samson was working for the estate at Miller's
request, Miller offered to pay Samson, and Samson performed the work requested. See TR
135 ll 23 through 149 ll 14 for the core of Samson's testimony about the work he
performed. However, because the parties never agreed to a specific rate of pay, no express
contract was formed and no remedy at law could be had. See TR 182 II 22-24. Since, the
Magistrate had concluded that there was no express contract formed, the equitable remedy
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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of an implied-in-fact contract could be resorted to by the Magistrate.
THE MEETING OF THE MINDS ISSUE
Formation of a valid contract requires that there be a meeting of the minds as
evidenced by a manifestation of a mutual intent to contract. Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho
636,645 (2011). An implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and
tacit understanding that there is a contract. Gray at 387. The general rule is that where the
conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's requests
and the requesting party promised payment, the court may find a contract implied-in-fact.
Id.

Miller continues to argue that the Magistrate and the District Court Judge found
there was no meeting of the minds as to the method or specific rate of compensation on
which to form an express contract, that there was no meeting of the minds upon which to
form an implied-in-fact contract. See Appellant's Brief at 6. This is not the correct legal
standard, the correct legal standard is that a meeting of the minds is evidenced by the
objective manifestation of a mutual intent to contract. Moreover, Miller's argument is
nonsensical because if there is a complete and total meeting of the minds that does not
implicate the statute of frauds, it would always result in an express contract. Clearly, Idaho
Law allows the formation of an implied contract on a meeting of the minds where there is
the objective intent to contract. See Clements.
Here, the Magistrate found that in February of 2009:
Mr. Samson and Ms. Miller had in implied-in-fact contract ground
on the parties' agreement and tacit understanding that there was
a contract. The parties conduct, as previously set forth herein,
allows for the dual inference that Mr. Samson provided work for
the estate at Ms. Miiler's request and that Ms. Miller promised
payment to Mr. Samson for his work.
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R 75. Said finding, impliedly finds and incorporates therein an objective mutual intent to
contract in February of 2009. Therefore, the Magistrate did not abuse his discretion
because he correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, he acted within the bounds of
discretion and applied the correct legal standards, reached the decision through an exercise
of reason, and he based his findings on substantial evidence.
SHOULD THE FOREGOING ARGUMENT FAIL,THEN IN THE ALTERNATIVE
Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, the Idaho
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals will affirm the order on the correct theory. See
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33 (2003). In this case, Samson argued

for unjust enrichment. The Magistrate found that all the elements of an unjust enrichment
claim had been proved but denied Samson's unjust enrichment claim solely on the basis
that "the evidence does not establish the value of the benefit the estate received that would
be unjust for the estate to retain without payment therefor to Mr. Samson." See R 72-74.
From the bottom of R 72 to the bottom of R 73, the Magistrate, in his findings,
correctly identified the following rules of law:
1. A prima facie case for unjust enrichment is: (1) a benefit conferred upon the

defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3)
acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant
to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. Independent
School Dist. of Boise City v. Harris Family Ltd. Partnership, 150 Idaho 583,590 (2011).

2. Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract
implied-in-law. Gray at 388. As previously addressed herein, a contract implied-in-law is
not a contract at all, but is an obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about
justice and equity without reference to the intent or the agreement of the parties Fox at
708. It is a non-contractual obligation that is to be treated procedurally as if it were a
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
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contract. Id.
3. The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not the actual
amount of the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment that would be unjust for one
party to retain without payment therefore. Gray at 388-89. The plaintiff has the burden of
proving the defendant received a benefit and the amount of the benefit the defendant
unjustly retained. Gray at 389. The value of services rendered can be used as evidence of
the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory of unjust enrichment. Id. However, the
measure of damages is not necessarily the value of the money, labor and materials provided
by the plaintiff to the defendant, but the amount of benefit the defendant received that
would be unjust for the defendant to retain. Independent at 589.
The Magistrate identified the correct legal standard insofar as he went, but he
overlooked an important commentary regarding the distinction between the quantum
meruit measure of damages and the unjust enrichment measure of damages. Although
Idaho law appears to measure recovery under quantum meruit by the fair market value of
the goods or services received and used by the defendant, while under unjust enrichment
the focus is on the value of the benefit which it would be unjust for the defendant to retain,
Idaho has also recognized that generally there is no difference between the two. Interform

Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270, 1278 (9th Cir. 1978). Further, footnote 4 of said opinion goes
on to explain:
A distinction appears in Idaho law between a recovery in quantum
meruit, where the parties have attempted to contract but the
contract is void or unenforceable, and a recovery in unjust
enrichment where there was never any attempt to arrive at a
contract. Compare Dale's Service Station, Inc. v. Jones, supra at
1105-06 and Weber v. Eastern Idaho Packing Co., 94 Idaho 694,
496 P.2d 693, 696 with Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d
1042 (1955) and Continental Forest Products, Inc., 95 Idaho 739,
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518 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (1974). In both situations, however, the
recovery granted is not based upon a contract and in both the
underlying standard for the recovery is the net benefit conferred
upon the defendant. As suggested in the text, although the
formula by which such benefits are measured may vary, in most
commercial contexts the recovery will be identical under either the
quantum meruit or unjust enrichment line of cases, Continental
Forest Products, Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., supra at 1206."

The Ninth Circuit's insight is informative regarding the language of Idaho's relevant legal
standard set forth in Gray and many other cases. The language in the measure of unjust
enrichment damages rules specifically contemplates, allows, and directs that the measure
of damages in unjust enrichment most often begins with the the value of the money, labor
and materials provided by the plaintiff to the defendant, even though the amount that
would be unjust for the defendant to retain might be less.
Here, Samson proved the reasonable value of services rendered and the Magistrate
should have considered it as evidence of the amount of the enrichment under the theory of
unjust enrichment. R 75-77. And although, the measure of damages is not necessarily the
value of the money, labor and materials provided by the plaintiff to the defendant, it very
well can be, and in this case it must be because there is no contradictory evidence showing
Miller was entitled to a different calculation or offset. Miller did not present any evidence,
or even argument, that contradicted Samson's equitable case -- that it was unjust for Miller
to retain the fair and reasonable value of his services and the expenses he incurred on
behalf of the estate. When the Magistrate found Samson proved the reasonable value of his
services and reasonable value of his expenses, and Miller failed to present evidence that a
different calculation or offset was appropriate in the case, Samson proved that dollar-fordollar Miller was enriched thereby and dollar-for-dollar that it would be unjust for Miller to
retain her enrichment thereupon.
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As stated above, it was Samson's burden to prove his measure of damages under the
unjust enrichment measure (unjust retention). Likewise, it was Samson's burden to prove
his measure of damages under quantum meruit (reasonable values). In this case, there is
no difference in the result from the two measures of damages.
Here, it was found that the reasonable amount of the value of money, services, and
materials that Samson provided to Mi Iller was $30,296.47 plus pre-judgment interest. R
81-82. The reasonable value of services rendered equals the amount of the enrichment. It
follows therefrom, that the amount of the enrichment less any equitable offsets equals the
amount that would be unjust for Miller to retain. It was not Samson's duty to prove any
offsets, or alternate calculations, that Miller might be entitled to.
Therefore, the Magistrate erred because he incorrectly applied the legal standard.
However, to the penny, the Magistrate reached the correct result on the alternate theory of
quantum meruit and therefore the Court should affirm the Order Granting Petition for
Allowance of Claim on the correct theory of unjust enrichment.

III. DID THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERR IN GRANTING QUANTUM MERUIT RELIEF WHEN
SAID THEORY WAS NOT ARGUED BY SAMSON?
Neither the Idaho Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals considers assignments of
error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief. See Hogg v. Wolske,
142 Idaho 549, 559 (2006) (emphasis added). Here, Miller cites no authority whatsoever
in support of her assignment of error. See Appellant's Brief at 7-8. Therefore, the issue
should be dismissed.
SHOULD THE ABOVE ARGUMENT FAIL, THEN IN THE ALTERNATIVE
The doctrine of quantum meruit is a remedy for an implied-in-fact contract and
permits a party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or material provided
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on the basis of an implied promise to pay. Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho
378,387 (2009).
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law and
equity supplement Idaho's probate statutes. Idaho Code§ 15-1-103. Equity not only
permits courts to analyze all the relevant facts, it also permits courts to consider any
equitable remedy. Climax at 797. Idaho's probate law operates in both law and equity. See
Idaho Code§ 15-1-103. However, an equitable remedy is not available, if there is a remedy
in law. Farmers Nat. Bank v. Wickham Pipeline, 114 Idaho 565 (1988).
Executors who fail to request clarification on a claim waive the right to challenge the
formal sufficiency of a claim. See Carlson v. Carlson's Estate, 93 Idaho 258 (1969). Further,
if the claim against an estate for services rendered clearly calls executors' attention to the
fact of services, the period during which rendered, and amount demanded that is all that is
sufficient for valid claim. See Nagele v. Miller; 72 Idaho 24 (1951).
A claim against a decedent's estate need not be in any particular
form; it is sufficient if it states the character and amount of the
claim, enables the representative to provide for its payment, and
serves to bar all other claims by reason of its particularity of
designation[... ] It is universally held that the statement of a claim
against a decedent's estate need not conform to the technical
rules of pleading, and the facts need not be set out with the
particularity of a complaint.

See Nagele at 27.
A claim against an estate need not state all the facts with the
precision and detail required in a complaint, but it is sufficient to
indicate the nature and amount of the demand in such a manner
as to permit the executor and the probate judge to act advisedly
upon it.

Id. at 27 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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This court has repeatedly stated that a claim against an estate
need not be drafted with the precision of a complaint, but rather it
is sufficient if it indicates the nature and amount of the demand in
such a manner that the executors and probate court can act
advisedly on it. The law is well settled that if there is any
uncertainty in a claim filed against an estate, it is incumbent upon
the executors to call for clarification. If the executor wishes to rely
upon a formal defect in the claim, he should make his objection
upon this ground known to the claimant in time to allow the
claimant to file an amended claim prior to the expiration of the
time allowed for filing. The failure of the executor seasonably to
raise an objection to the form of the claim constitutes a waiver of
the right to rely upon formal defects in rejecting the claim. This
does not mean that when suit is brought on the rejected claim the
claimant is relieved of the obligation of proving the validity of his
claim. The respondents will have an opportunity at trial to dispute
the existence of the debt and to call for a clarification of the nature
of the claimant's demand.

Carlson v. Estate of Carlson, 93 Idaho 258, 260 (1969) (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
A pleading shall specify the relief sought but it may add as general prayer for such

further or other relief as may be deemed just and equitable, even without the prayer for a
specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. See Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425,
432-433 (1990).
Equitable subrogation derives from the equitable power of the courts and it should
be administered to ensure real and essential justice without regard to form. Because
sufficient facts were alleged in the complaint to give rise to subrogation, and because those
facts were established at trial, the district court did not err in finding liability on the theory
of subrogation. Hoopes v. Hoopes, 124 Idaho 518, 522 (App. 1993).

If the plaintiffs' prayer for relief seeks not only a declaratory judgment but also
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general equitable relief, the plaintiffs are entitled to invoke the long arm of equity to receive
whatever relief the court may from the nature of the case deem proper. Any relief can be
granted under the general prayer which is consistent with the case stated in the complaint
and is supported by the proof provided the defendant will not be surprised or prejudiced
thereby. Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296,308, 309 (1998).
Here, this is a probate case and Samson stated the character and amount of the claim
with sufficient particularity to enable the representative to provide for its payment, and to
bar all other claims by reason of its particularity of designation. That is the personal
representative knew how much to pay Samson, where to send the money, and that this
would preclude any other claims for Samson's labor and expenses. See Petitioner's Exhibit
9A. Further, it is universally held that the statement of a claim against a decedent's estate

need not conform to the technical rules of pleading. So there was no need for Samson to
even plead law or equity or formulate a formal prayer for relief. It is true, Samson did not
specifically plead for quantum meruit relief, but he did state in his Answer to Counterclaim
that he believed his claim arose in equity. R 27. It is also true that at trial, Samson's
attorney did not argue for quantum meruit relief but rather argued for relief under unjust
enrichment. The Hoopes, Eugenio, and Pamela B. courts clearly show that a general prayer
for equitable relief allows the court to fashion any other equitable relief that fits the
evidence. 2 Miller does not argue that the evidence does not fit the relief granted here, but
rather argues that Samson failed to argue for the specific relief granted. The law does not
require Samson to do so. Miller cannot claim that she was prejudiced by Samson's
attorney's failure to argue for quantum meruit relief, because the relief ordered was driven
by the pleadings and the evidence in the case, all of which Miller was privy too. As the
Nagele court stated, the failure of the executor to seasonably to raise an objection to the
2

Note that Eugenio and Pamela B. cases are persuasive, but not binding authority. Hoopes is binding authority.
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form of the claim constitutes a waiver of the right to rely upon formal defects in rejecting
the claim.
With respect to the Magistrate's finding that quantum meruit was an appropriate
remedy -- the Magistrate did not abuse his discretion because he correctly perceived the
issue as discretionary, acted within the bounds of discretion, applied the correct legal
standards, reached the decision through an exercise of reason, and based his findings on
substantial evidence.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE
Where the lower court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, the Idaho
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals will affirm the order on the correct theory. See
Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Mussell, 139 Idaho 28, 33 (2003). In this case, Samson argued

for unjust enrichment. The Magistrate found that all the elements of an unjust enrichment
claim had been proved but denied Samson's unjust enrichment claim solely on the basis
that "the evidence does not establish the value of the benefit the estate received that would
be unjust for the estate to retain without payment therefor to Mr. Samson." See R 72-74. As
set forth above, Samson proved the reasonable value of his services and the reasonable
value of his expenses enriched Miller dollar-for-dollar, and there was no evidence to
contradict Samson's case that it would be unjust for Miller to retain any portion of said
benefit, dollar-for-dollar.

IV. DID THE MAGISTRATE COURT ERR IN AWARDING REASONABLE VALUE OF SERVICES
AND REASONABLE EXPENSES DAMAGES?
For a quantum meruit claim the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the
services rendered or of goods received, regardless of whether the defendant was enriched.
See Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 434-435 (App. 2002).
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Miller contends that there was no evidence of the reasonable value of the services.
This is not true. Samson billed Miller and therein stated that he thought $20 was fair for
the services he provided. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. He also stated therein how many
hours he worked and the type of work he completed. Id. "Fair" and "reasonable" are
synonymous here, and the trial court is entitled to make reasonable inferences from the
evidence. Further, Mr. Samson testified that his bill was a low estimate as to the work he
did for the Estate and the expenses he incurred.
Clark: So this bill was on the hours that you spent is an estimate?
Samson. Yes.
Clark: Is this a highest estimate or a low estimate?
Samson: It's a low estimate.
Clark: Is it your testimony today, then, that you whatever is in that
bill you believe to have been correct and accurate at the time that
you presented the bill or prepared the bill?
Samson: Yeah.
TR 167 ll 25 through 168 ll 9.
Samson is not under any burden to present his evidence of his reasonable value of
his services evidence by specifically invoking a phrase of art such as "$20 per hour was the
reasonable value of the services I provided." That would be like saying that a murderer who
confessed on the stand that he thought about it all day prior to beating his victim to death
was not guilty of premeditated murder on the theory that no witness invoked the magic
words of "malice aforethought."
Further, Samson presented the fuel expenses that showed up on Mr. Samson's
father's credit cards. See Petitioner's Exhibits 17 through 31. The amount of the charges
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were made by Mr: Samson and the fuel provider are arm's length transactions and are
evidence of the reasonable value of the goods received. Samson testified that all the
purchases were used on behalf of the Estate. TR 163 - 165. Under Miller's theory, because
Samson did not invoke the magic words that fuel bills were "the reasonable value of the
expenses incurred," that there was no evidence of the same. That is an absurd and
meritless conclusion.
Moreover, Samson's statement in his bill that $20 per hour was a fair amount for his
services was bolstered by many witnesses, who had provided similar services in the local
area.
Dewey Bailey, who fed Mr: Manes horses, charged $25 an hour to feed horses. See
TR 23 11 6-15. This was the same person that Mr. Manes trusted to feed his horses the three
months preceding his death. 3 TR 211114-18. These were the very same horses that
Samson fed.
Ed Groseclose said it would take three workers two months to just sort the scrap out
of the personalty. He testified that laborer's would receive a rate of $10 per hour and a
supervisor would receive a rate of $15 per hour. TR 3611 7-21 and TR 38115-15. Assuming
a person works a 40 hour week for 8 weeks that is $11,200 in labor ($400 a week for
laborer 1 + $400 a week for laborer 2 + $600 a week for a supervisor). That is just to sort
out the scrap and did not include hauling off garbage, etc. Id. Also keep in mind that Mr.
Samson, being Almon and Virginia's long time and trusted friend was uniquely qualified to
identify and set aside keepsakes where others would think it was junk as Steve Kalinoski
had thought. See Petitioner's Exhibit 3 and 6, TR 128 ll 12-22, TR 27 11 15.
Zane Cunningham testified that he was paid $4,000 for just cataloging an estate -- a

3

For his efforts the Millers called Mr. Bailey a worm and instead of paying him an amount they thought to be fair
they paid him nothing. TR 22 II 2-10.
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task that took him weeks. TR 11 23. Mr. Samson worked months and he did far more than
catalog. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. He supervised the winding down of an Estate that had
an enormous amount of personalty. Three airplanes, perhaps 50 cars, all sorts of farm
implements, batteries, and on and on. It was the Personal Representative that chose not to
have an Estate sale. She was the one that chose to have Mr. Samson sort through all of this
and to set aside the "good stuff" and put it into containers. See Petitioner's Exhibit 11 & TR
90 II 20 through 9111 2. That's precisely what Mr. Samson did and there is no evidence to
the contrary.
William Howell testified that as a ranchhand and general laborer he made $8 per
hour in Idaho county. TR 80 II 13. Idaho county is situated in the state of Idaho and in this
state minimum wage is $7.25 per hour.
However, again, the reasonable value of the goods and services Miller received was
best proved by Samson himself. Given all of the different responsibilities Samson had he
figured $20 an hour for his labor was fair (see Petitioner's Exhibit 9A) or in other words, the
reasonable value of the services rendered. There was no testimony or evidence that
directly challenges the $20 per hour figure. There was no testimony or evidence that
challenged Samson's wear and tear on the tires. There was no testimony that the amount
paid for fuel was unreasonable. Once more, the magistrate found Samson's testimony to be
credible.
Mr. Samson testified and presented evidence regarding the
reasonable value of the services he provided to the estate. Ms.
Miller did not testify or present any evidence. The court finds Mr.
Samson's testimony and the evidence he presented on the issue
credible, and there being no contradicting evidence presented by
Ms. Miller, accepts Mr. Samson's testimony and evidence regarding
the reasonable value of services he provided as fact.
R 76, footnote 3.
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Miller wrote to Samson agreeing with him that the job was hard and it was a lot of
responsibility. See Petitioner's Exhibit 6, 12, & 13. Milller had the opportunity to object to
foundation and cross-examine Samson as to his bill and failed to undermine the bill or his
testimony relating to it. Similarly, Miller had every opportunity to disprove Samson's
calculation of what was a fair hourly rate with her own witnesses, but she did not contest -with any evidence -- that rate was not a reasonable value of the services rendered. Thus,
the rate of $20 per hour was the established and uncontroverted reasonable value of his
services.
Samson worked at least 1193 hours in the service of the Estate. See Petitioner's
Exhibit 9A & TR 16711 25 through 16811 9. At $20 per hour the value of his labor alone is

$23,860. Samson purchased $1,586.02 in fuel on behalf of the estate, which is still indebted
for, and for which he only asked for 80% of the value thereof or rather $1,268.82. See
Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. Samson purchased tires for his pickup in the amount of $1181

which he attributed 65% of the wear to service to the Estate for a total of $767. Id. Samson
even gave the Estate a $1500 offset for the value of the Honda ATV Four-Wheeler that he
was given, which the Magistrate awarded Miller an optional credit for. Id. & R 81-82.

V. IS SAMSON ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL?

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 the Respondent requests attorney fees and costs
for opposing the Personal Representative's appeal. Miller essentially continues a frivolous,
baseless and meritless pursuit of getting the Magistrate's decision overturned. Miller has
failed to make a serious effort in identifying applicable law and fairly represent the record
causing Samson to once again take extra effort to unravel the multitude of Miller's baseless
contentions.
Miller's first issue is that the trial court erred by finding the parties did not have an
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express contract based upon performance. See Appellant's Brief at 3. Therein, Miller cites
only that "Equity does not intervene when an express contract prescribes the right to
compensation. Vanderford Company, Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,558 (2007)." Said
authority in no way sheds light on Miller's issue, and therefore the issue was brought
without any basis, frivolously, and without merit.
Miller's second issue is that the trial court erred by finding that an implied-in-fact
contract existed between the parties. See Appellant's Brief at 5. Miller cites that implied-infact contracts are "dependent on mutual agreement or consent,and on the intention of the
parties; and a meeting of the minds is required. 17 C.J.S. § 6(b) at 422." Miller had notice of
binding authority. R 8. Nevertheless, Miller inexplicably cites only persuasive authority in
regard to what is required in the formation of an implied-in-fact contract. Further, Miller
cites on page 6 of her brief, that "Quantum meruit is the appropriate recovery under a
contract implied-in-fact. Barry v. Pac. W Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827,834 (2004)." Again,
said authority in no way sheds light on Miller's issue, and no additional authority was cited
for this issue. Therefore, the issue was brought without base, frivolously, and without
merit.
Miller's third issue is that the trial court erred in granting quantum meruit relief
when said theory was not argued by Samson. Miller cites no authority whatsoever in
support of the issue she raises. Therefore, the issue was brought without any basis,
frivolously, and without merit.
Miller's fourth and final issue is that the trial court erred in granting damages when
no evidence was presented at trial regarding reasonable value of services. See Appellant's
Brief at 3 & 8. As stated above, Miller's contention that there was no evidence of the

reasonable value of the services is just plain false. Samson billed Miller and therein stated
that he thought $20 was fair for the services he provided. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. He
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also stated therein how many hours he worked and the type of work he completed. Id.
"Fair" and "reasonable" are synonymous here, and the trial court is entitled to make
reasonable inferences from the evidence. Further, Mr. Samson testified that his bill was a
low estimate as to the work he did for the Estate and the expenses he incurred. TR 167 ll
25 through 168 ll 9. Additionally, as stated above, Samson produced many witnesses who
testified the going rate for similar work from the local area.
In addition to the foregoing failures to cite relevant and binding legal authorities in
support of the key issues in her appeal, Miller makes many baseless, frivolous, and
meritless statements regarding the evidence adduced at trial that are misleading:
ONE
Samson provided services for the Estate on his own free will. See
TR 188 II 22-23.

Appellant's Brief at 2. This statement is Miller's intentional act to mislead or confuse the

Court into believing that Samson did not expect compensation in return for the services he
rendered, which is patently false. Samson testified as follows:
Clark: Mr. Mitchell spent some time trying to get or trying to get at
whether you were forced or you volunteered or voluntarily went
out to the Almon Manes' Estate. So my question is: Did you ever
come to the decision that you were going to work on the Almon
Manes' Estate without compensation? Was it your intent that you
would go out there and not get compensated?
Samson: No. My intent was to be well compensated.
Clark: Okay. And you went out there willingly expecting to be
compensated?
Samson: Yeah.

TR 189 ll 6-16.
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TWO
At trial, Samson went through and testified about all of the
obligation in the Agreement that he performed. Samson argued
that performance could establish, or bind a party, without a
signature ... Miller respectfully contends that the evidence at trial
supports a finding that the Agreement and its terms is binding
based on performance as argued by Samson ... Samson performed
under the Agreement and argued for its enforceability. The only
enforceable contract, whether it be express or implied, is the
Agreement based on performance as argued by Samson.

Appellant's Brief at 3, 5 & 10 (emphasis added to the factual mistatements). These
statement are Miller's intentional act to mislead or confuse the Court into believing Samson
waived or is estopped from pursuing alternate theories of recovery because his attorney
made an argument in favor of using Miller's May of 2009 written proposal to examine
Samson. See TR 149 1119 through 150 111-20. Samson's attorney was entitled to speculate
upon, pursue, and abandon alternate theories of recovery as he deemed to be in his client's
interest. Samson has long since suspended pursuing the alternate theory that he might be
entitled to all of the property listed in Miller's May of 2009 written proposal. Miller is
aware of this but nonetheless makes such baseless, meritless, and frivolous statements.
THREE
The evidence in the record is in not in [sic] dispute that Miller told
Samson that he would not be compensated with money... While
Samson testified that he told Miller he wanted money, Miller did
not agree and told Samson that he would be well compensated ...
This is a matter where Miller consistenlty stated that monetary
compensation would not be paid.

Appellant's Brief at 4, 6 ( emphasis added). While it is not in dispute that Miller attempted to
get Samson to agree to no monetary compensation on a couple of instances, Miller omits
that Miller told Samson that he was going to be put on the payroll and issued checks for his
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labor. TR 176 ll 15 through 177 ll 1 & Petitioner's Exhibits 6 & 12.
FOUR
Samson never testified to the Court that he was requesting $20
[per hour] ... Exhibit 9A was a letter Samson allegedly sent regular
and certified mail to Miller. There was never any testimony as to
its contents ...
Appellant's Brief at 9. Samson presented to Miller a bill for the fair value of his services

which he calculated to be $20 per hour. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9A. Not only did Samson
actually send the bill, he testified at length about the contents therein, and further,
regarding the bill Samson testified that he estimated on the low side to the benefit of the
estate. TR 157 ll 5 through 168 ll 9. The Magistrate was within his discretion infer
therefrom that Samson's bill and the statements regarding the fairness of his bill
represented the reasonable value of his services. Miller's misstatements and omission on
such key facts reveal the meritless, baseless, and frivolous nature of her appeal.
CONCLUSION
The District Court's Order on Appeal affirming the Magistrate's Order Granting
Petition For Allowance of Claim should be affirmed, either "as is" or under the alternate

theory of unjust enrichment, and the Respondent's request for attorney fees and costs
should be granted.

Thomas J. Clark
Attorney for espondent
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